by Phil Rowe
It is pretty clear that I am not, and never have been, very astute at politics, particularly the politics related to foreign military sales programs.
In l974 and l975 my assignment was that of Director of Engineering on the E-3A (AWACS) program. I got onto the program not by choice. My recent promotion to Colonel, coupled with having had four years on station at Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio, made me a candidate for reassignment. It seems that the AWACS Program Director was in need of an Engineering Director and I was available. My experience on the B-1 program apparently qualified me for the job he needed filled.
The AWACS was, in those days, a most remarkable system. It represented a genuine leap forward in the state of the art of airborne command and control systems. Its Westinghouse radar was the most advanced aerial surveillance type in the world, capable of acquiring and tracking multiple targets of many kinds. As a system for supporting air battle management, its sensors and communications gear were without equal. And the Boeing-built airframe with Pratt-Whitney engines was a solid platform for those advanced electronics. It was clearly a great asset to the Free World's defenses.
I enjoyed my role in the E-3 Program Office. The work was very interesting, though occasionally quite challenging because of the problems of integrating the efforts of multiple contractors and participating government entities. But we were blessed with a number of very capable people dedicated to creating a truly worthwhile product.
I could not bring myself to support some of the political aspects of the program, especially the foreign sales of the AWACS to the likes of the Shah of Iran. The State Department and Boeing were aggressively promoting the sale of several AWACS to Iran, and many Pentagon people were on the bandwagon. But I was convinced that such a sale would seriously compromise national security. I earnestly believed that transfer of that technology to Iran ( or any foreign power ) would quickly lead to our adversaries knowing all about the capabilities and potential of the AWACS. For the AWACS was truly a major advancement in our defensive capabilities and in no way should be put at risk by putting it in the hands of our so- called allies. ( History has borne out my concerns with the fall of the Shah and adversarial role taken on by the new regime ).
I found it increasingly difficult to cooperate with the senior Washington people promoting the AWACS sale. It even got to the point where I felt it necessary to disobey my General , when asked to host technical discussions with the foreign military sales agencies of the Defense and State Departments. I became, at the least, a reluctant participant in those sessions which I could not escape. At times my boss even had to call me on the carpet for being uncooperative.
The motivations behind the sales of AWACS were many and complex. One of the driving motivations was, however, for Iran and NATO countries to share in the costs of AWACS. By increasing the production run beyond the numbers projected to meet U.S. needs, it would follow that the per-unit costs of our models and theirs might be less expensive. And of course Boeing would be the big beneficiary of added sales to whomever might buy the system. The pressures to facilitate the sale of AWACS were tremendous. I realized that I could no longer, in good conscience, remain a part of the program. So in early l975 I decided to put in my retirement papers. That may have been the easy way out, but I was not a very astute person or particularly suited to waging a political battle against what was a high pressure, big stakes movement. While I was experiencing a great deal of inner turmoil about the whole activity, I was powerless to change things and decided to get away from it.
In fact, if the truth were known, I was very much relieved to get away from all of the politics of the AWACS program. For even without the foreign military sales aspect there was a high degree of wheeling and dealing by senior Pentagon folks and Boeing on every aspect of the program. I was clearly unsuited to that environment where decisions are based on political expediency ( probably a euphemism for dollars ) rather than technical merit or national security interests.
I was, and probably still am, very naive about the way things work. This is especially true where big money is involved. While I continue to enjoy the benefits of a generous military retirement as a Colonel, I probably would have been better off to have stayed at a lower level and concentrated on the technical and day-to-day aspects of R&D programs. I have always been uncomfortable dealing with political animals.