Yet accurate bombing was the name of the game in Strategic Air Command (SAC). In fact it was the primary measure of crew and equipment effectiveness. The career fortunes of the crew, collectively and individually, hinged on their success in hitting targets. Effective crews got rewarded and the others didn't. It's that simple. Getting bombs on target, accurately and consistently, under all kinds of conditions, was what SAC was all about.

High altitude bombing has always been a challenge, for there are so many factors which affect where the bomb hits. Once the weapon is dropped it not only starts its descent, it slows down and trails behind the bomber. It falls in an arc determined by the aerodynamic characteristics of the bomb itself and the atmosphere all the way to impact. This falling behavior is known as the ballistics of the weapon and each different type of bomb has its own unique ballistics.

Low altitude bombing presents most of the same challenges, plus the added problem of short horizons, obstacle and terrain avoidance, and less time to correct errors. The added complications of being down in the weather and much rougher air turbulence further complicate the task of bomb delivery.

SAC bombers from the early B-50's and B-36's to the later B-47's, B-52's, B-58's, FB-111's and B-1's were loaded with sophisticated navigation and bombing equipment. The radar navigator bombardier (RN) was the one charged with precisely locating the target and making sure that the airplane tracked to the proper bomb release point. He had to make sure that the ballistics data for his particular weapons were entered into the computer, to make sure that the bombs are released at the exact places and times to reach the targets along the unique falling paths from bomber to each target. These were gravity bombs whose ballistics were not altered in descent, as are more modern "smart bombs" which are guided from release to impact in various ways.

Multi-million dollar sophisticated bombers of SAC's heyday (B-52's, 58's, FB-111's and the B-1's) contained complex and highly capable bomb-aiming equipment. High resolution radars gave the RN fine quality images of targets in all kinds of weather. Clouds and darkness were not a problem.

Other devices like Doppler radars gave precise information to the navigation and bombing computers on aircraft ground speeds and cross-track drift. Inertial navigation systems and their associated computers could help the RN place his radar cross-hairs right on the target or designated aiming point. All he had to do then was ensure that necessary ballistics data, target coordinates and elevation were properly set and the "system" would take care of the rest. Well, not exactly.

When the equipment worked as designed, things generally went pretty well and RN's did their job effectively. But things didn't always go right. And some targets were easier than others to find. It's quite different to locate and aim at a prominent target like a bridge, rail yard or industrial complex than finding a single remote underground missile silo. It's also not easy to precisely aim at a particular building in a large city, where multiple radar returns merge into a single smear on the scope. RN's have to use different techniques in each situation.

Among the various aiming and target tracking techniques available, each method had its own limitations and probabilities for error. Visual sighting and tracking with an optical system was the best, but that didn't work well above the clouds, through haze or in darkness. Next best was radar. With radar the RN could see the echo returns of the terrain below and place the computer-driven crosshairs upon the desired aiming point. That aiming point was not always the target itself.

Sometimes it was better to aim at a small, easy-to-find and readily distinguishable radar echo (return) a distance away from the actual target. This technique, known as offset aimpoint bombing, took advantage of the bombing computer's ability to track one place and bomb another. Direct precision bombing and offset bombing were generally very accurate, but depended upon both the skill of the RN and the performance of the computers.

Another technique, one which goes back to WWI and WWII days, is known as fixed angle bombing. As the bombardier (or RN) looks out ahead of his airplane he seeks that point in space and time where the release should be made to ensure a hit on the target. The sighting angle, from the horizontal plane of the bomber's flight path, downward to the target is reached at but one place. The bombardier must guide his aircraft to that precise point and be sure that the flight path is properly aligned when the release point is attained.

There is a tall tale still going around about fixed angle bombing with a pocket comb. According to the lore of bombardiers, a crewman faced with making a bomb release despite a broken bombsight had to improvise. So he took his boots off and held a pocket comb between his toes. He sighted along the ends of the comb's teeth, whilst holding his leg extended in front of him. When the target approached the line of sight from eyeball to comb, the bomb release point, at a fixed angle, was achieved. In some ways that what we did in SAC's costly and sophisticated bombers, on a regular basis.

Without the benefit of a visual target sighting and the use of a pocket comb, SAC's finest bombardiers (RN's) did the next best thing. They used their radar's fixed range circles on the scope when the computer was inoperative. By timing the interval between passage of a known radar return (echo) and the distance to the desired bomb release point, it was possible to hit targets, though not as precisely as when everything was working. In fact, fixed angle bombing methods were employed even when all appeared to be functioning properly, because it could serve as a backup in the event things went awry on the run into the target.

This writer must admit that many, very many, bomb runs in the B-58 were made solely with fixed angle and timing techniques. Though we had a terrific bomb-nav system (when it all worked), it frequently failed, forcing us to use back-up techniques. Fixed angle bombing at both high altitudes and low was a regular and frequent practice.